3. The world of relation: SEM
This
world of relation falls out from the raster of
conventional reference schemes. I will therefore devote a few more paragraphs to
its discussion. Whitehead
is one worker who has
developed the paradigm of the world as
society and relations in his work
"Process and Reality" (1969)
[31]. His
construction of the world system consists of entities, prehensions, processes,
relations, and
nexus
[32]:
3.1. Whitehead's view of the world as system of
societies
Whitehead
(1934:
33): There is the animal life with its central direction of a society of cells,
there is the vegetable life with its organized republic of cells, there is the
cell life with its organized republic of molecules, there is the large-scale
inorganic society of molecules with its passive acceptance of necessities
derived from spatial relations, there is the inframolecular activity which has
lost all trace of the passivity of inorganic Nature on a larger
scale.
(1969: 24): Actual
entities involve each other by reason of their prehensions of each other. There
are thus real individual facts of the togetherness of actual entities, which are
real, individual, and particular, in the same sense in which actual entities and
the prehensions are real, individual, and particular. Any such particular fact
of togetherness among actual entities is called a 'nexus' (plural form is
written 'nexus'). The ultimate facts of immediate actual experience are
actual entities, prehensions and nexus. All else is, for our experience,
derivative abstraction.
(1969: 33): An actual
world is a nexus; and the actual world of one actual entity sinks to the level
of a subordinate nexus in actual worlds beyond that actual
entity.
(1969: 34): It is
fundamental to the metaphysical doctrine of the philosophy of organism, that the
notion of an actual entity as the unchanging subject of change is completely
abandoned. An actual entity is at once the subject
experiencing
[33] and
the superject of its experiences... The ancient doctrine that 'no one crosses
the same river twice' is
extended.
[34] No
thinker thinks twice; and, to put the matter more generally, no subject
experiences twice... In the philosophy of organism it is not 'substance' which
is permanent, but 'form'. Forms suffer changing relations; actual entities
'perpetually perish' subjectively, but are immortal
objectively.
(1969: 117): The
physical world exhibits a bewildering complexity of such societies, favouring
each other, competing with each other. The most general examples of such
societies are the regular trains of waves, individual electrons, protons,
individual molecules, societies of molecules such as inorganic bodies, living
cells, and societies of cells such as vegetable and animal
bodies.
(1969: 118): Thus a
molecule is a subordinate society in the structured society which we call the
'living cell'.
(1969: 114-115): The
appeal to Plato in this section has been an appeal to the facts against the
modes of expression prevalent in the last few centuries. These recent modes of
expression are partly the outcome of a mixture of theology and philosophy, and
are partly due to the Newtonian physics, no longer accepted as a fundamental
statement. But language and thought have been framed according to that mould;
and it is necessary to remind ourselves that this is not the way in which the
world has been described by some of the greatest intellects. Both for Plato and
Aristotle the process of the actual world has been conceived as a real incoming
of forms into real potentiality, issuing into that real togetherness which is an
actual thing. Also, for the Timaeus, the creation of the world is the incoming
of a type of order establishing a cosmic epoch. It is not the beginning of
matter of fact, but the incoming of a certain type of social order... of the
hierarchy of societies composing our present epoch... The physical world is
bound together by a general type of relatedness which constitutes it into an
extensive continuum.
Of course his notion of "society" (like a
society of
molecules) is not like that of a human society. Here, a more abstract principle
is meant, an "analogous structure" as introduced by
Salthe
(1993, pp. 89-90):
Salthe (1993, pp. 89-90): [For example,
take 'intentionality'.] My move will be the opposite; that is, to give back to
nature itself such human attributes. This can be done using the logical form
shown in figure 1.2. [p. 18]. We are searching for what Bigger and Bigger (1982)
call "analogous structure". So, we can see that the 'intentionality' proper that
we are all familiar with is a member of a more general class of characteristics
implied by it. There is no label for that class - we might use {intentionality}
for it. This is a member of the same category as intentionality proper, but it
is a more general logical type. The class in which that is embedded would be
{{intentionality}}, and so on... If we have intentionality, then our ancestors
must have had {intentionality}, and theirs {{intentionality}}. In the logic of
specification hierarchy we cannot avoid this conclusion. Viewed from the center
of such a structure, nature looks very different indeed than it does from the
perspective of philosophical mechanism.
The "analogous structure" of society as used by
Whitehead
is the principle of (inter-)
relation
and inter-dependence. And by this, we could (with some additional work) arrive
at the notion that even atoms and chemical compounds are to be considered as
"societies" rather than as atomic (isolated or isolable) entities-in-themselves,
which would consequently lead to a natural science based on the relation
principle. A salient issue of the "society" view is the preference of
connectedness and cooperation over isolation and competition, the hallmark of
natural science and neo-darwinist discourse. (Montagu
1976: 43-44): "This aspect of cooperation was also formulated early in the
biological field by Espinas
(Des Societés
animales), the Russian workers Kessler
(On the law of
mutual aid), and Kropotkin
(Mutual aid: A factor of
evolution)". It is also reflected in the conception of the
biosphere in
the work of Vernadsky
.
A similar position is expressed in the present
socio-informational position as expressed by
Marijuán
, ranging the full spectrum of phenomena
from the 'society of vacuum' via the 'society of cells' and the 'society of
neurons' up until the 'society of nations' (1996: 90). And extending that
further, we may even arrive at a 'society of the universe' as envisioned by
Teilhard de Chardin
(1981: 264-267).
As Whitehead
mentions above
(114-115), we can find the origin of this line of thought in western philosophy
in Platon's Timaios (Platon
1988: 53 C, 54, 55). When
we examine these passages, we find Platon describing there the ultimate building
elements of all matter as simple geometrical patterns, triangles, and polygons,
and the derived spatial
Platonic Solids. (Reale
1993: 488-496). This view of the ultimate composition of the universe is a
different statement of the basic principle that the spatial geometrical
relations of the atoms (i.e. the most basic configuration forms of the
molecular society, in Whitehead
's diction) are what
defines the "nature" of chemical compounds. This is corroborated by present
(bio-) molecular chemistry:
Kampis
(1996:
122): By utilizing the geometrical form as a determiner of interactions,
macromolecules recur to an open-ended set of variables, modulated by other
molecules...
These example show that it is possible to establish a
theoretical foundation for using the relational principle of society as a
general principle, not only of human affairs, but as a general paradigm.
3.2. The SEMsphere
I will now come back to the world view of SEM, and introduce
the SEMsphere, the world of social relation, language, and meaning.
3.2.1. The home of the unicorn
We now have to perform a crucial Gedankenexperiment,
and to perform it, we need the cooperation of the reader.
Dear reader: please create for yourself a mental picture of
a lush green meadow by a forest, with a small creek running through it. Imagine
the scene as vividly as you can or want. Imagine the sweet scent of the herbs,
and the pleasant feeling of the warm wind as it caresses the leaves. Now,
visualize in the center of that meadow a beautiful creature, with slender, lithe
body, graceful like a deer, light in color, a unicorn. Imagine that unicorn as
vividly as you can or want. See it strolling around the meadow, enjoying itself.
Now, dear reader, I ask you the crucial question: Where does that unicorn
live?
The answer has three stages, and all need to be considered as
valid.
1) The first obvious answer is that it lives in that scenery
that we just imagined.
2) The second answer is that it lives in the imagination,
commonly also called the mind.
But that is not all:
3) The third answer is that it lives in the SEMsphere. This
realm is the domain of all mental projections that are intersubjectively {shared
/ exchanged}, mainly through the mechanism of language.
The present usage is derived from
Lotman
(1990).
3.2.2. Lotman's semiosphere
Lotman
(1990:
123): By analogy with the biosphere, (Vernadsky's concept) we could talk of a
semiosphere, which we shall derive as the semiotic space necessary for the
existence and functioning of languages, not the sum total of different
languages; in a sense the semiosphere has a prior existence and is in constant
interaction with languages. In this respect a language is a function, a cluster
of semiotic spaces and their boundaries... Outside the semiosphere there can be
neither communication, nor language.
The unit of semiosis, the smallest
functioning mechanism, is not the separate language but the whole semiotic space
of the culture in question. This is the space we term the semiosphere.
The semiosphere is the result and the condition for the development of culture;
we justify our term by analogy with the biosphere, as Vernadsky defined it,
namely the totality and the organic whole of living matter and also the
condition for the continuation of life.
Lotman
, (1990:
125), [citing Vernadsky on the biosphere]: ... all life-clusters are intimately
bound to each other. One cannot exist without the other. This connection between
different living films and clusters, and their invariancy, is an age-old feature
of the mechanism of the earth's crust, which has existed all through geological
time.
The same idea is expressed more clearly
again:
The biosphere has a quite definite
structure which determines everything without exception that happens in it... A
human being observed in nature and all living organisms and every living being
is a function of the biosphere in its particular
space-time.
The quotation shows that Vernadsky considered the biosphere as
a system of societies of interrelated living beings. Vernadsky's terms for
describing the biosphere is equivalent to Maturana's coupling of organisms
through the medium. (Maturana
1982: 288), also
Ziemke
(xxxx: 18).
3.3. Paticca samuppada as first principle of
cognition
The importance of the
paticca samuppada as a cognitive
a priori principle for the formation of the concept of the SEMsphere must now be
presented. Joanna Macy has shown the equivalence of the fundamental principle of
paticca samuppada in Buddhist philosophy to the core tenets of general
systems theory. To connect this work to the general morphological theme of the
present discussion, we need to understand the importance of the
relation-process principle of
paticca samuppada as
a first
principle of cognition (or
a priori, following
Kant
, see Popkin
1956: 134). This
will be expounded in the following paragraphs. The main literature reference on
paticca samuppada is Macy
(1991). Secondary
references: Buddhadasa
(1956-1992). Page number
references, if not otherweise indicated, refer to Macy
(1991). Macy focuses explicitly on the Buddhist theory of
paticca
samuppada (also referred to as
dependent co-arising in her work), or
mutual causality, the title subject of her book. For her sources, she
concentrates on the very earliest scriptures of the Pali Canon, representing
pre-Abhidharmaist thought, the
Sutta and
Vinaya Pitakas (p.
2). Her reason for this is given in the introduction:
(
p. 2): I focus on
them, ... because their presentation of dependent co-arising [=paticca
samuppada] differs from the Abhidharma in some subtle but significant ways,
which, as I delineate in Chapter 3, have implications for our understanding of
mutual causality. These differences are often overlooked since the Abhidharma
has tended to influence later interpretations of Pali texts as a whole, and
paticca samuppada in particular. While the later concept of emptiness
(shunyata) in Mahayana Buddhism renewed the emphasis on radical relativity found
in the early teachings, such similarities fall outside the focus of this
book.
(
p. 3): The
expressions mutual causality, reciprocal
causality, dependent co-arising, interdependence, and
indetermination are, for the purposes of this book, taken as roughly
equivalent in meaning.
As to the term general systems
theory, it is not a theory proper, in the sense of a single hypothesis about
a given set of phenomena, so much as a coherent set of principles applying to
all irreducible wholes. These wholes, be they molecule, cell, organism,
personality, or social body, reveal common principles and properties that are
amenable to understanding when we view them as self-organizing systems. What we
have here is not a theory about general systems, but rather a general theory (or
a set of principles) about systems, which allows their dynamics and
characteristics to become intelligible...
Some thinkers prefer the term
cybernetics for the concepts and processes pertaining to self-regulating
systems... I broaden it to systems-cybernetics and use it interchangeably with
general systems theory...
Mavy cites the original account of Gotama, of his discovery
when he became the Buddha of this epoch:
(p.
5-26), Samyutta Nikaya,
II.91:
There arose in me vision, knowledge arose,
insight arose, wisdom arose, light arose. Just as if, brethren, a man faring
through the forest, through the great wood, should see an ancient path, an
ancient road traversed by men of former days. And he were to go along it, and
going along it he should see an ancient city, an ancient prince's domain,
wherein dwelt men of former days, having gardens, groves, pools, foundations of
walls, a goodly spot.
(
p. 45), Digha Nikaya, II.36:
This were a matter hard to perceive, namely
this conditionality, this paticca samuppada ... against the stream of common
thought, deep, subtle, difficult, delicate...
(
p. 38), Digha Nikaya, II.33:
I have penetrated this truth, deep, hard to
perceive, hard to understand, calm, sublime, beyond logic, subtle, intelligible
only to the wise. But this is a race devoting itself to the things to which it
clings. ... And for such a race this were a matter hard to perceive, to wit,
that this is conditioned by that (ida paccayata paticca samuppado)...
When the Buddha contemplated the essential difficulty of
understanding the paticca samuppada, he was tempted not to teach (p. 38). Macy
cites Nyanatiloka (the Abhidharmaist scholar) as authority for the
difficulty of comprehending the concept of paticca samuppada:
(p. 45): None of all the teachings of
Buddhism has given rise to greater misunderstandings, to more contradictory and
more absurd speculations and interpretations than the Paticca Samuppada, the
teaching of the Dependent Origination of all phenomena of
existence.
What is the reason for this essential difficulty to comprehend
the essence of paticca samuppada, and why does it have such central importance?
(p. 28): Such words remind us of the limits
of scholarship. No textual exegesis or conceptual elaboration can substitute for
the training and psychological investment considered requisite for an
understanding of paticca samuppada. We need, therefore, to be mindful
that all conceptual treatments of dependent co-arising are by their nature
limited and inadequate.
(p. 45-46): By virtue of the universality
and impersonality of the causal process it perceives, it has also been acclaimed
as a milestone in human thought... The reciprocity of causal process is integral
to the Buddha's teaching of paticca samuppada. It is inherent in the
doctrine of anicca and the denial of a first cause, evident in the
interdependence of causal factors, and reflected in the linguistic structures
employed.
From Substance to
Relation
This, the essential cognitive switch of perception from
"
Substance to Relation" is described (as much as that is possible at all
in words) in the chapter of Macy's book from p. 46 on. She starts with an
outline of the foundations of the common
substance view of reality that
is characterized by "entities-substances that can impinge on others and transmit
properties to them." (p. 46). Such a basic cognitive principle is here called
a priori in a slight modifiation of the Kantian usage. The notion of
a
priori needs to be further clarified.
Kant
[35], in the diction of
Popkin
:
Popkin
(1956:
134): Our contacts with the experiential world supply
the content of our knowledge, but our facilities supply the form in which we
know it.
Now, the form in which we know the experiential world is
determined by these factors:
1) the biologically given
ratiomorphic apparatus
RMA
[36] of the sensory and neuronal processes
.
2) the SEMsphere conceptual and symbolic
filters.
[37] 3) Our individual disposition and action at that very moment
when we cognize something
[38].
There are two vital issues connected with the presentation of
the paticca samuppada view. First is the the non-substantiality
and the relation-process principle as fundamental a priori cognitive
principle. One may also call it a cognitive attractor in the present
neuro-biological usage (Spitzer 1996: 185-188, 338). The other is the
meta-noia, or fundamental reorganization of perception. The for the
Western science baffling, and un-understandable aspect of the Buddhist teaching
has always been this factor of meta-noia, the "jump out of the system",
which is unfortunately mostly labeled with a mystical term "enlightenment" or
"awakening". We need to understand the basically Gestalt principle of
fundamental (a priori) cognitive re-orientation that the Buddhist philosophy has
not been able to formulate in concepts, but it has instead concentrated on the
practical and pragmantic aspects how to bring about the meta-noia, the
transmutation of the cognitive system, which brings about the
meta-morphosis of the cognized world as its result. The Buddhist practice
has presently two different ways to achieve this result: the mediative approach
of the Theravada school, with the Vipassana meditation, and the "sudden
enlightenment" approach of the Zen school. There had apparently been a
third approach, called Madhyamika, in the school of Nagarjuna, which was
a logical path. Unfortunately this school died out when the muslims conquered
India and eradicated the Buddhist tradition there. So any information I have on
this school must be inferred indirectly from the writings of Nagarjuna which can
in effect be understood only after the meta-noia has taken place, and are
completely unintelligible from the conventional mental position. Goppold (1994).
[31] The work appeared first
in 1929.
[32] Connexion, combination,
intertwinement, gr.: synapsis, symplexis
For lack of the original character in the text: "u" with a bar
"-" on top, this is writing is substituted here: nexus.
[33] See the formal
equivalence of the following paragraph with the buddhist discussion of
paticca samuppada, below.
[34] As was formulated by
Heraklit, B 49a.
[35] ... Wo doch "der
Verstand a priori niemals mehr leisten könne, als die Form einer
möglichen Erfahrung zu antizipieren" (Kant, in Mittelstraß 1984:
1078).
[36] The
Weltbildapparat of Konrad Lorenz and Rupert Riedl, the term
ratiomorphic apparatus was coined by Brunsvik.
[38] As for example expounded
by Heidegger in
Sein und Zeit, (Mittelstraß 1984: 1078).
